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Abstract 
The question of how effective EU’s external governance is cannot be 
answered without looking at the broader geographical and historical 
framework in which the Union extends its influence. We argue that 
interdependence between Ukraine and Russia in several key aspects shapes 
the context within which the EU and Russia compete to export their policies. 
Based on an analysis comparing the institutional rules underpinning EU’s 
external governance and the CIS rules as well as several sectoral analyses, 
we show that the effectiveness of external governance varies with the 
patterns of interdependence. We identify sectoral differences in the extent of 
Ukraine’s interdependence with Russia: it is low and receding in trade; 
medium in foreign policy and high in energy.  
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Introduction 
External governance, as elaborated earlier in this volume, is a way for 
the European Union (EU) to extend a common system of rules beyond its 
legal and geographical borders (Lavenex, 2004, Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig in this volume). In this paper we argue that the question of 
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how effective EU’s external governance is cannot be answered without 
looking at the broader geographical and historical framework in which the 
EU extends its influence. Ukraine, a state with ambitions to join the EU, a 
close neighbor of Russia, is a suitable test case to address the question how 
EU’s external governance is affected by other powers.  
We conceptualize external governance as a way for the EU and 
neighbouring countries to cope with interdependence. The EU’s external 
governance, especially when it involves institutionalized frameworks for 
political dialogue, networks or non-state actors, contrasts to Russia’s 
traditional politics of power, aiming to re-establish Russia’s influence over 
neighbouring states as a regional hegemon. Russia’s policies are also 
sometimes embedded in the regional framework of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), created as a tool for coping with interdependence 
after the USSR disintegration. Russia’s power, inside or outside the CIS, has 
the potential of interfering with EU’s external governance and its ability to 
lead to policy transfer in several ways. First, by using existing institutional 
commitments in the CIS framework, its framework of bilateral agreements 
or other mechanisms of formal coordination. Second, by exercising power 
policies in areas, where interdependence (structural, geopolitical, economic) 
is high. The existence of such constraints has important implications, 
ranging from delineating a clear limit to what the EU can achieve in its 
neighbourhood policies to requiring internal EU policy adjustments to take 
into account Russia’s presence, as for example with energy policy.  
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 Even though external governance has been developed as a theoretical 
perspective that moves away from traditional geopolitical analyses, the 
different character of EU external governance does not eliminate the need to 
consider power. Given the fact that Russia, as a centre of power, poses very 
considerable constraints for EU external governance, we put 
interdependence1, the key variable determining Russia’s power and ability 
to limit EU’s policy extension, at the centre of our analysis. Rather than 
arguing, as the institutional model formulated by Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig (2009) does, that the degree of existing institutionalization 
affects the success of external governance, we see interdependence as the 
driving force for institutionalization. For example, the EU started 
formulating an energy strategy and institutionalizing a policy internally 
because it needs to deal with energy dependence on Russia and transit 
dependence on Ukraine. In such cases, EU institutional rules appear to be 
the effect, rather than the cause of developments in the foreign policy arena. 
Therefore, we argue, in line with the power model formulated by Lavenex 
and Schimmelfennig (2009) that interdependence with Russia is a key 
variable defining the effectiveness of EU’s external governance. 
Based on an analysis of the institutional rules underpinning EU’s 
external governance as well as several sectoral analyses, we argue that the 
effectiveness of external governance in terms of rule selection, adoption and 
implementation (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, in this volume) varies with 
the patterns of interdependence. We suggest that different kinds of 
 4
interdependence between Ukraine and Russia – legacy-driven, structural/ 
institutional, geo-political or finally, economic interdependence – define the 
context within which the EU and Russia compete to export their policies and 
rules.  
Before we analyse how EU external governance and Russia’s power 
interact in different policy areas in Ukraine, we first outline the existing 
system of institutional and legal rules that make the formal foundation of 
EU or CIS governance. Next, we examine rule adoption driven by the EU’s 
external governance in three different policy areas, namely ‘deep trade’, 
energy, and foreign and security policy. The levels of interdependence 
between Russia and Ukraine in these policy areas vary from low to high. 
Based on this variation, we show that different patterns of interdependence 
with third states can present different level of constraints to EU rule transfer.  
  
1. Comparing institutional underpinnings of governance2 
 
 EU – Ukraine institutional and legal relations 
The interactions between the EU and Ukraine have been so far defined 
by EU’s reluctance to acknowledge Ukraine as a full-fledged candidate for 
membership. The possibility of enlargement remains, however, a crucial 
feature that characterizes EU-Ukraine relations. The reason why this is 
important is that, just as it was in the early phases of the EU’s enlargement 
to the East, the Union’s ability to govern (externally) is derived from the 
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prospect of membership (Friis, 1998:6). This prospect introduces in EU-
Ukraine relations the asymmetry that we know from accession negotiations. 
Since the EU has not made the Ukraine an official candidate, many of the 
tools and instruments that express the power asymmetry such as Accession 
partnerships cannot be used. The existing tools and institutional 
arrangements that underpin external governance, for example the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), bear the imprint of the 
power asymmetry and indicate the predominance of the hierarchal mode of 
governance defined in this volume. Through these institutions, the EU 
exercises its power in a technocratic, low key mode, yet the asymmetry 
remains and can be seen in the elements of conditionality existing in all 
institutional agreements and instruments.  
The PCA between Ukraine and the EU was signed in June 1994 and 
entered into force in March 1998. From an institutional point of view, it 
creates several bilateral organs which, as with other EU agreements with 
third countries (and especially the EU’s Association Agreements with 
Central and Eastern Europe), have the potential to take a life of their own in 
shaping the common regime. The institutions create conditions for EU-
Ukraine political and expert dialogue. The provisions for structured 
meetings at different levels3, from leaders’ summits to senior civil servants, 
parliamentarians and experts, provide for a possibility for network 
governance to develop. 
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The PCA provides further for considerable projection of EU rules: ‘The 
rules of the PCA introduce extensive, legally binding commitments with 
considerable implications for the domestic legislation of Ukraine’ (European 
Commission). How binding these commitments are, however, varies 
between the specific provisions. The trade provisions of Title III are fairly 
precise and impose clear, enforceable obligations. Other provisions, e.g. in 
the area of labor cooperation, amount to no more than ‘best endeavour’ 
clauses and compliance with these depends on the overall disciplinary 
framework of the PCA.  
It is important to note that the approximation of Ukrainian legislation to 
the EU is among the main priorities and determinant features of the PCA 
regime. Article 51 contains a list of areas which are to be included in the 
approximation process. As formulated, the article provides for a voluntary 
endeavor on the part of Ukraine to make its legislation compatible with the 
EU. Thus, it stops short of a ‘hard’ obligation for adoption of the acquis, 
which would materialize should Ukraine become an official candidate for 
membership.   
The PCA does not contain any references to membership and neither 
does it have provisions suggesting pre-accession conditionality. It does, 
nevertheless, contain conditionality. In particular, Article 2 of the PCA 
defines respect for the principles of market economy as an essential element 
of the EU-Ukraine partnership. The consensus is that when Article 2 is read 
in combination with the suspension clause of Article 102 (‘The Bulgaria 
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clause’) and the ‘material breach’ requirement of Article 60 (3) (b) of the 
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, amounts to a complex suspension 
procedure in case of a failure to comply with democratic principles and 
market mechanisms.4  
Another important aspect of the PCA regime relates to its dispute 
resolution provisions as a disciplinary mechanism. The PCA envisages a 
special procedure, whereby parties submit disputes to the Cooperation 
Council or, in case of its failure to resolve them, to a number of conciliators 
(Article 96, PCA). Similarly, under Article 102, parties are allowed to take 
‘appropriate measures’ in case of a failure of the other party to fulfill an 
obligation, which normally require notification to the Council. The decisions 
of the Council or the mediator, however, have only the power of 
recommendations.  
The development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of the 
EU added a new dimension to the partnership relations with Ukraine. It is, 
however, primarily a set of institutional, legal and policy arrangements that 
respond to the EU citizens’ desire for ‘prosperity, security and stability’ 
(Ferrero-Waldner, 2006). The ENP has also been aptly characterized as an 
adaptation of enlargement policies to the foreign policy domain (Kelley, 
2006: 29). It relies on the legal and institutional structure of the PCA. The 
central instrument of this policy towards the Ukraine - the Action Plan (AP) 
of 2005, is a ‘soft law’ document, adopted as a Recommendation of the PCA 
Cooperation Council (Cremona and Hillion, 2006).   
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While denying membership, the AP seeks to strengthen the positive 
aspects of conditionality by promising enhanced economic integration, or a 
‘stake in the internal market’,5 and a set of rewards. It envisages clear 
benchmarks in the political and economic sphere which would trigger 
deepening of the relationship. Alongside these concrete steps, the AP 
arguably also strengthens the ‘values’ conditionality of the PCA, as progress 
is dependent on the adoption of the ‘shared values’ at the core of the ENP.  
The AP contains the promise of a new Neighborhood Agreement to 
supplement the existing framework, which would provide for ‘new 
entitlements and obligations’ (Action Plan). There is currently a great deal of 
expectation and discussion regarding the nature, contents and legal basis of 
this agreement (Hillion, 2007, Shapovalova, 2008, Sushko et al, 2008). Even 
though it has still some way to go, some key elements are already clear. 
Deep trade provisions would be central. The core of the agreement would 
define areas of cooperation as the main dimensions of the external 
governance projected towards the Ukraine.  
Clearly, domestic Ukrainian institutions and politics are also a key 
variable determining the success of conditionality and external governance 
as a whole. There are, however, other rules and agreements which play a 
role in Ukraine’s case – these of the CIS. 
 
Ukraine – CIS/SES/Russia relations 
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The CIS is a regional integration structure that seems, at first sight, to 
serve a similar function as the EU and other regional integration bodies, 
namely, to help its members deal with interdependence. Previous analyses, 
however, show that CIS does not provide ‘hard law’ constraints to its 
members’ actions and does not require irreversible commitment from them. 
It can be identified as a ‘soft’ regime remaining short of inducing formal 
compliance in the countries which have signed up to it (Dragneva, 2004). Yet 
despite serious institutional weaknesses of the CIS and the ambivalence of 
Ukraine’s position within it (Dragneva and Dimitrova, 2007), the CIS 
remains an important reference in Ukraine’s international relations.  
Ukraine is represented in most of the common institutions of the CIS. It 
has made a maximum use of the flexibility of the organization’s institutions 
in order to minimize any loss of sovereignty. Yet, Ukraine continues to be a 
regular party to the structured political dialogue taking place at the various 
CIS meetings. Even in cases when Ukraine has eventually decided not to 
sign a certain CIS decision or agreement, it has frequently taken part in the 
process of its preparation.  
In addition to structured political dialogue, a key function of the organs 
of the CIS is to serve as a medium for cooperation in areas of common 
interest through the conclusion of international agreements. Cooperation 
within the CIS is structured through a multiplicity of international 
agreements – multilateral and bilateral. Thus, the undertaking of any 
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commitments and the extension of any common rules remains firmly within 
the sphere of international law.   
In its range of areas for cooperation, the CIS can be described as a ‘broad 
house’. Some areas can be characterized by greater intensity of cooperation 
and efforts to build a multilateral framework, such as trade (Dragneva and 
De Kort, 2007). Yet, the international regime in most of them can be 
characterized as particularly loose and soft. Even when Ukraine has chosen 
to sign certain agreements, it has frequently used various devices to mitigate 
the legal effects of the commitments made in them, such as reservations, 
general or vague provisions, delayed ratification (Dragneva, 2004). The CIS 
is also known for its ‘spaghetti bowl’ of agreements, leading to conflict of 
rules, uncertainty and lack of coherence (Freinkman et al., 2004). 
Importantly, Ukraine’s position in the CIS institutional framework is 
subject to weaker disciplines or sanctions. It has chosen not to participate in 
the CIS Economic Court set up in 1992. The 1994 Free Trade Agreement, 
signed by Ukraine, envisaged a dispute resolution sequence of measures 
including resort to the Economic Court. Yet, such a provision is more the 
exception rather than the rule and Ukraine has not been involved in a 
dispute brought before that Court.  
Given the specific institutional features of the CIS regime, its 
effectiveness ultimately depends on Ukraine’s will to be bound by it. Thus 
this regime does not amount to a legal constraint to EU’s external 
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governance. The level of Ukraine’s involvement in the CIS arrangements, 
however, can be changed and is potentially subject to influence from Russia.   
When discussing possible constraints for EU’s external governance, it is 
important to refer also to one of the sub-regional organizations created 
within the post-Soviet space, that of the Single Economic Space (SES). This 
formation causes some concerns in view of the compatibility of the 
commitments undertaken by Ukraine and those undertaken towards the EU, 
which mostly stem from the institutional structure of the SES. Importantly, 
the founding Agreement of 2003 provides for a ‘single regulating organ’ 
with some supranational elements to which participating states would 
delegate competences on the basis of international agreements (SES 
Agreement, 2003: Articles 4 and 7). Further, this Agreement sets up a very 
minimal and general regime for the SES. Its provisions resemble more 
statements of intent rather than a basis for credible legal obligations. One of 
the main principles of the SES, like the CIS, is ‘variable-level and variable-
speed integration’ (SES Agreement, 2003: Article 5) where countries 
determine for themselves to what extent and in what frameworks to 
participate. 
Despite the fact that Ukraine has defined its interest in SES primarily in 
terms of free trade – it is clear that the SES is another forum for high-level 
dialogue. The initial expectation that Ukraine will be formally pulling out of 
it did not materialize; on the contrary, there have been indications of plans 
to play an active role in shaping it (Timoshenko, 2005, Terekhin, 2005).6  
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The overview of the EU’s external governance as projected through the 
PCA and ENP versus the CIS/SES suggests that the EU is clearly more 
advanced in using institutions to structure governance and to project 
policies. This does not mean, however, that Russia’s role can be neglected. 
Interdependence in specific areas creates a crucial opening for Russia to 
exercise power in a more traditional sense, even if it does not channel it 
through CIS institutions. In the following sections, we start by examining a 
sectoral area with receding interdependence, namely trade. We proceed to 
look at an area where arguably more interdependence exists (foreign policy) 
and finally analyze an area which is a textbook case of high  
interdependence between Russia and the Ukraine: energy. We seek to show 
that EU’s ability to influence policies and transfer its own rules is 
constrained by Russia’s power in cases where interdependence is high. In 
cases when interdependence is lower, the EU appears to be more successful 
in projecting its rules.  
 
 
2.  Policy regimes: Trade 
 
Ukraine - EU 
 
Given the EU’s core competences in trade and economic integration, 
trade is a policy area where we have seen sustained EU efforts to extend its 
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rules or promote compatible rules. Trade relations have been in the heart of 
EU and Ukraine relations as set up by Title III of the PCA and by specific 
sectoral agreements.7 These relations were given a boost and prioritized 
more specifically with the adoption of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan of 2004, 
and more recently with the accession of the Ukraine to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2008 and the negotiations for an enhanced 
neighbourhood agreement.  
The contents of the EU-Ukraine regime has been discussed at greater 
length elsewhere (Dragneva and Dimitrova 2007, World Bank, 2004). An 
important feature of this regime is the progressive liberalization and 
evolution of the regime leading to larger volumes of trade between the two 
sides. For example, an important step was made with the recognition of the 
Ukrainian economy as a ‘market economy’ in December 2005, which 
lowered the severity of special protective measures still allowed under the 
PCA (Emerson et al, 2006: 51). The Ukraine’s WTO accession in 2008 was 
critical in respect of abolition of quantitative restrictions or equivalent trade 
barriers and liberalization of trade in steel and textiles. It allowed the start of 
the negotiations on a ‘deep and comprehensive’ free trade agreement as part 
of the new Enhanced Neighbourhood Agreement.  
 
Table 1: Trade balance (exports and imports) of the Ukraine in 1990 - 2007 
 1990 1993 1996 1999 2003 2007 
Exports  100 100 100 100 100 100 
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RF 54.6 34.8 38.7 20.4 18.7 21.9 
Rest of CIS 26.6 11.5 12.7 7.3 7.5 6.9* 
EU 5.6 6.4 11.1 20.5 19.8 30.6 
Baltics 1.7 1.1 1.8 1.5 3.8 n.a. 
Imports 100 100 100 100 100 100 
RF 58.0 45.1 50.1 48.0 37.6 25.3 
Rest of CIS 20.3 19.0 13.4 9.8 12.4 8.6* 
EU 5.3 8.2 15.4 23.1 25.2 44.9 
Baltics 2.3 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.1 n.a. 
Sources: WB Trade Policy Study, November 2004. Regarding 2007 data: EU Trade 
statistics, Ukraine, 2008. 
* the number refers to major CIS partners only. 
Secondly, it is important to note the extent of rule transfer inherent in 
the evolution of the trade regime. The PCA contained an evolutionary clause 
for the establishment of a free trade area subject to the advancement of 
economic reform in Ukraine and the development of the PCA trade regime 
(PCA, Article 4). This clause did not introduce a hard obligation, yet it was 
indicative of the long-term intentions of the parties. A further impetus to the 
development of the trade regime was given with the adoption of the ENP 
policy and the 2004 Action Plan. The AP emphasized the full 
implementation of the provisions of the PCA and particularly ‘the 
approximation of Ukrainian legislation, norms and standards to those of the 
EU’ (AP, 2004). Further advancements in the trade regime were critically 
dependent on Ukraine’s progress in its WTO accession. Thus, the adoption 
of the WTO acquis, applicable to the EU as well, was an essential aspect of 
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the rule transfer process. This suggests, as argued by Barbé et al (2009) in this 
volume, that the EU’s own norms are in some areas part of international sets 
of norms and taking a view focusing on the EU as the only norm maker is 
misleading.  
Despite the issues still under negotiation, it is clear that ‘deep trade’ 
entails further harmonization of key aspects of the regulatory environment 
started with the PCA and detailed further in the AP. As Emerson et al. (2006) 
have shown, deep trade would affect not only a range of sectors (financial, 
energy, transport, etc), but also introduce parts of the EU acquis ranging 
from competition policy to corporate governance, labour and environmental 
standards. In fact, in its substantive scope a forthcoming deep trade 
agreement is better described as ‘internal market minus’ agreement (Gstöhl, 
2008). Moreover, deep free trade, for the EU, is embedded in ideas of the 
Neighbourhood Economic Community or the most recent Eastern 
Partnership initiative, aiming for a common regulatory space in the 
neighbourhood region (European Commission, 2006: 5).   
Thus, clearly, in trade the EU has a comprehensive rule transfer 
agenda, strengthened by the WTO context. Yet, the EU has also had to take 
into account the trade relations of the Ukraine and Russia/CIS and the 
extent to which the CIS has represented a competing provider of rules and 
policy export. 
 
Ukraine – CIS/SES/Russia 
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Within the Soviet Union, Ukraine was part of a single market and all 
trade was in effect domestic trade. The break-up of the Union saw the rapid 
disintegration of this economic system, which the new independent states 
sought to contain through the CIS. They also embarked on a new course of 
reintegration largely driven by and centered around Russia (Dragneva, 2004, 
Dragneva and De Kort, 2007). It is important to note the extent of this 
reintegration in the area of trade and the degree to which it can restrain EU 
external governance. 
Ukraine operates a free trade regime with the CIS based on a complex set 
of bilateral and selective multilateral engagements (Dragneva and De Kort, 
2007, Dragneva and Dimitrova, 2007). This regime does not cover all trade in 
the sense that it allows for exemptions to be negotiated in separate 
protocols.8 Its effectiveness is diminished by the possibility to apply 
unilateral special protection measures without adequate provisions in terms 
of dispute resolution on their adoption or interpretation. In effect, there has 
been a succession of “trade wars” between Russia and Ukraine in which 
relations have escalated through reciprocal measures (World Bank, 2004). 
The trade regime, despite its evolution through the years, can be described 
more as a ‘simple’ rather than a ‘deep’ free trade, characterized by a weak 
institutional basis (Dragneva and De Kort, 2007).  
The CIS regime entails some level of harmonization particularly in the 
area of customs legislation and administrative practice. Another key area, 
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largely reflecting inherited interdependencies, is that of technical standards. 
CIS Member States inherited the USSR system of standards (GOST) which 
was not recognized in the rest of the world. For example, one of the early 
multilateral CIS agreements provides for the recognition of the USSR 
standards as international standards for the CIS countries. The agreement 
also provided for policy coordination in standardization, metrology and 
certification through the special Intergovernmental Council (Dragneva and 
De Kort, 2007).  
This regime, however, has failed to contribute to significant levels of 
trade reintegration. As Table 1 shows, trade decline has continued. There are 
many reasons for this, yet it has been argued that it is due to a large extent to 
the institutional and legal weaknesses of the regime (Freinkman et al, 2004). 
Administrative and other non-tariff barriers between CIS members continue 
to exist as a result of failed domestic reforms and low quality of governance 
and remain a crucial factor limiting trade. 
 
Receding Interdependence in Trade and Few Constraints to EU Governance 
 
In general, there are four reasons why Ukraine - CIS/Russia trade 
relations, as described above, do not represent a major competing centre to 
the EU. First, as explained above, the CIS is a weak, simple trade area. 
Secondly, Ukraine has maintained a position within the CIS which allows it 
a great deal of flexibility. An important feature of the free trade agreements 
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is a standard clause whereby their provisions do not preclude participation 
in other organizations or agreements, which do not contradict their 
objectives and terms.9 
Thirdly, the EU trade regime recognizes and encourages Ukraine’s 
cooperation with former USSR states. It allows any free-trade or customs 
union arrangements (including such on free transit) made by Ukraine with 
its CIS partners (PCA: Articles 3, 11 and 12, Annex 1). Indeed, regional 
cooperation within the CIS has been one of the important premises of the 
PCA framework. Similarly, the ENP and the concept of Neighbourhood 
Economic Community promoted in 2006 focus on promoting regional 
cooperation.  
Fourth, the process of adoption of the WTO acquis has an effect that 
minimizes rules clashes. Other than Ukraine, four other CIS countries are 
already members of the WTO (Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Moldova and 
Georgia), and most of the others have advanced in their progress to 
adapting the WTO regulatory framework. As the review of free trade 
agreements concluded within the CIS shows, there are a growing number of 
references to WTO interpretations and norms (Dragneva and De Kort, 2007).   
While current arrangements do not constrain the Ukraine in EU rule 
selection and adoption at present, a potential future deepening of the 
economic integration agenda within the CIS or SES would create 
incompatibilities (Emerson et al., 2006, Cremona, 2004).10 Such a deepening 
seems unlikely in the CIS, despite the fact that initially free trade was 
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conceived as a first stage in the progressive achievement of an economic 
union. It remains a possibility, however, within the SES, which refers, in its 
founding documents, to the creation of an economic union. If Ukraine were 
to enter into a customs union with its SES partners (or another CIS 
constellation), it would be the union’s institutions, not Ukraine that would 
renegotiate current (or pending) free trade arrangements with the EU, and 
vice versa, in the case of membership into the EU. Thus, participation in both 
an EU and a SES customs union would be impossible.  
Importantly, the move to a ‘deep trade plus’ arrangements with the EU 
in the context of the New Enhance Agreement raises the level of 
commitment in terms of adopting various aspects of the EU acquis. Given the 
growing emphasis on regulatory harmonization, key aspects of Ukraine-CIS 
relations, such as the issue of technical standards mentioned above, assume 
even greater importance and constrain EU governance by affecting rule 
adoption and implementation.  Given the benefits for the EU from continued 
free trade relations in the region, it has been argued that ‘it would be 
desirable for Ukraine’s CIS partners to also persuade their institutions to 
approximate to EU norms, rather than maintain idiosyncratic rules’ 
(Emerson et al., 2006: 63). 
Thus, in the area of trade, the EU external governance has been growing 
and effective in transferring the EU’s (and WTO) rules. We see this in 
correlation with Ukraine’s diminishing dependence on trade with Russia 
and the CIS. Significant trade reorientation has taken place and the share of 
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CIS trade has decreased significantly (see Table 1). Yet, some economic and 
geographical interdependence between Ukraine, Russia and CIS remains. 
Russia is a key trade partner of Ukraine, particularly in the area of energy 
imports, as will be discussed below. There are important institutional 
legacies, such as in the area of standards, which will still affect EU rule 
adoption and implementation.  
The next policy area, foreign policy, is one in which interdependence 
stems from important historical legacies and geographical proximity and 
constrains the EU’s efforts to promote Ukraine’s adoption of its foreign 
policy and addressing its security concerns. 
 
 
3. Policy regimes: Foreign and security policy  
 
Ukraine – EU 
 
In contrast to the PCA, in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) the EU is arguably trying to extend its own policies beyond its 
borders without extending the institutional framework. The alignment of 
Ukraine with EU’s Common Positions and Joint Actions since 2000 and 
especially since 2005 suggests that Ukraine has taken on board EU policy to 
a considerable extent.11 In 2005, Ukraine had aligned itself with 549 out of 
589 CFSP declarations, or 93% (European Commission, 2006) and in 2007, 
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Ukraine had aligned itself with 833 out of the total of 907 of relevant 
statements, or 92% (Razumkov centre, National Security and Defense, 
2007a:6). However, it is important to note the exceptions which include, 
significantly, EU joint actions and common positions regarding Belarus and 
the Southern Caucasus (see also Barbé at al 2009). 
In crisis management, an important aspect of CFSP, Ukraine has signed 
an Agreement establishing its participation in EU crisis management 
operations (European Commission, 2006:5) and has been active in providing 
troops for peace keeping missions. Ukrainian participation in the EU Border 
Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) can be taken as an 
interesting example of policy convergence. Arguably, the EU projects its 
own demands for border security while at the same time the Union and 
Ukraine address a security need important for both Ukraine and Moldova.  
 
Ukraine – CIS/Russia 
 
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has strived to lead an 
independent of Russia foreign policy and to pursue several vectors in its 
external relations. Yet, by virtue of both history and geography, it has 
repeatedly found itself in the position of having to align itself closer with 
Russia, particularly prior to 2004. Even after 2004, developments such as the 
recent conflict in Georgia reveal the limits to EU’s ’soft’ governance. 
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In terms of the institutional framework of security relations, Russia has 
promoted a multitude of international treaties within the CIS. These treaties 
have covered a wide range of issues, such as terrorism, conventional 
weapons, and ethnic conflicts. The treaties provide for procedural 
cooperation, standardization and the formation of specialized governing 
bodies and organizational structures (Willerton and Beznosov, 2007). An 
example of how such treaties, seemingly dormant, can be reactivated and 
make an impact, was a CIS agreement on peacekeeping missions that, 
according to some, provided the justification for the Russian army actions in 
Georgia in August 2008 (Silina, 2008). 
As Willerton and Beznosov note, the Ukraine has been selective and 
cautious in committing to the CIS treaties, while at the same time has, like 
other CIS countries, sought to distance itself from Russian dominance (2007). 
They show that Ukraine has signed 30 out of the 53 security agreements 
concluded in the period 1992-2004 (Willerton and Beznosov, 2007: 59). 
Wolczuk notes that it joined some only under extreme energy supplies 
related pressure by Russia (Wolczuk, 2007).  
More important than these institutional arrangements has been 
interdependence in the form of inherited legacies such as the position of the 
Black Sea Fleet. The Russian Black Sea fleet, positioned in the Crimea, has 
been a constant source of worry for Ukrainians with its possible implications 
of foreign policy dominance. At the same time, Russia relies on Ukrainian 
facilities and infrastructure for the fleet. In 1997 the two countries reached an 
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agreement, providing that from 2008 Russia would pay Ukraine market rent 
for facilities rented by the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Such payment would, 
among others, strengthen Ukrainian control over the stationing of the fleet. 
The practical implementation of this issue, however, was tied up in the 
Ukrainian 2008 budget law with the Ukrainian debt to Russia of 1.3 billion 
USD for gas (Silina, 2008). This example illustrates the complex 
interdependences not only within one policy sector, but also between 
sectors.  
 
Interdependence with Russia remains an important factor in policy choice 
 
On the whole, we can conclude that EU governance has been effective 
in policy transfer. Yet, in important areas driven by historical legacies and 
geopolitical interdependence, policy alignment and policy implementation 
have been significantly constrained. The non-alignment of the Ukraine with 
the EU’s common position on Belarus, mentioned above, shows the 
country’s response to regional interdependence despite its general decision 
to follow the EU’s lead. Ukraine has declared that it shares the EU’s views 
on the political regime in Belarus, but has consistently tried to mediate in a 
dialogue with Belarus, including high level meetings (Melyantsou and 
Kazakevich, 2008:70). 
Importantly, the EU’s ability to export its governance in foreign 
relations is also constrained by the resurging idea of Russia as a regional 
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power and corresponding Russian policies, including violence. Analysts 
have pointed out that after 2003 and especially after Ukraine’s ‘Orange 
revolution’, Russia has abandoned the idea of CIS as a liberal trade 
community and has embraced the idea of its regional power status instead 
(Krastev, 2005). During Putin’s second presidency, there has been a 
consistent effort in reasserting Russia’s traditional sphere of influence 
(Jonson, 2004, Vinokurov, 2007, Godzimirski, 2007). The Russian view of 
sovereignty is a much ‘harder’ concept than the EU’s notion of fluid borders 
and multiple regimes. Following from this hard concept of sovereignty is the 
Russian idea that Ukraine is and should firmly stay in its sphere of 
influence.  
The new Russian assertiveness in foreign policy has counteracted 
Ukrainian (and Georgian) aspirations to join NATO with effective lobbying, 
but also with politics backed by force: the actions of the Russian army in 
Georgia in August 2008. After the start of the conflict, Russia accused 
Ukraine of supplying arms to Georgia, leaving Ukrainians to wonder if the 
country was being provoked into conflict. Anatoliy Gritsenko, chairman of 
the Ukrainian Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee, described 
Russian Foreign Ministry’s statement that ‘Ukraine has armed Georgia 
inciting it to intervention and ethic purges’ as ‘provocative, irresponsible 
and untrue’ (Silina, 2008). Further, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign minister 
Yeliseyev stated that the presence of a large Russian minority in the Crimea, 
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made Russian actions in Georgia a direct threat to Ukrainian security and 
the Ukraine a de facto third party in the conflict (Rettman, 2008). 
The crisis which split the Ukrainian governing coalition in September 
2008 started ostensibly as a result of the different responses of President 
Yushchenko and Prime Minister Timoshenko to the Russia-Georgia conflict. 
The former accused the latter of high treason for allegedly siding with 
Russia over the Georgian conflict. While this paper does not focus on 
domestic Ukrainian responses, this conflict indicates the extreme 
vulnerability of Ukraine to external influences due to domestic political and 
regional divisions. 
Thus, we find evidence that interdependence with Russia in foreign 
policy has constrained EU external governance – partly in policy adoption 
and significantly in actual policy implementation. Yet the area where 
constraints stemming from interdependence are most visible is not foreign 
policy but energy. 
 
4. Policy regimes: Energy 
 
Ukraine-EU 
 
Energy has been one of the priority areas of ENP since the beginning. It aims 
to enable integration with the European energy market, but also to ‘help the 
countries concerned come in line with European standards and norms’ 
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(Ferrero-Waldner, 2006). Ukraine’s integration into EU’s energy market as a 
part of a deep trade arrangement requires the adoption of a set of regulatory 
standards. 
The Ukraine is highly important for the EU as a transit country for gas 
coming from Russia. As an indication of this importance and of overall 
interdependence, 76% of the Russian gas comes to the EU via Ukraine, 20.3% 
is delivered via Belarus and 3.7% is delivered directly from Russia to 
Finland (Razumkov Centre, 2008). 
The EU has a Memorandum of Understanding with Ukraine on Energy 
cooperation (2005). Ukraine’s key role is mentioned in the Commission’s 
Green paper on Energy (2006). The country gained observer status in the 
Energy Community Treaty in 2006 and applied for full membership in 2007.  
In 2007, the Commission allocated €87 million for the reform of the 
Ukrainian energy sector. The Commission and the Ukraine have agreed 
upon a selection priority projects in the electricity, gas and oil sectors 
(European Commission, 2008). Such actions encourage policy transfer 
through the network mode of external governance by funding projects 
involving a multitude of domestic actors. The gas crises in 2006 and 2009 
when Ukrainian-Russian conflict disrupted severely gas supplies for EU 
members, have shown, however, that energy is still a matter of high politics.  
 
Ukraine- Russia 
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Energy has always been a key area within the CIS. The development 
of institutional structures has been promoted by Russia in selected areas (the 
CIS Electric Power Council from 1992), but Ukraine has participated 
selectively in such arrangements. It joined the Council in 1992, but refused to 
sign the Agreement on the Formation of a Common Power Market in 2007 
(Vinokurov, 2008).  
More importantly, and particularly in the critical area of oil and gas, 
Russia has maintained bilateral relations, which have taken place at the 
highest levels of negotiation and in an atmosphere of secrecy (De Souza, 
2008). Further, intra-CIS trade has been plagued by non-transparent barter 
arrangements, discriminatory access to pipelines and corruption 
(Dodsworth et al. 2002, Stern, 2005). Energy interdependence has been 
explicitly used by Russia in the CIS context for political purposes 
(Godzimirski, 2007, Razumkov centre, 2007b). Russia’s bilateral deals and 
contracts for gas deliveries with EU member states and Ukraine represent 
the best example of interdependence as a source of power which interferes 
with effective governance by the EU. 
Gas and oil trade have become a traditional power arena, where 
states seek to capitalize on structural advantages.  Russia has repeatedly 
used price and indirect taxation as a policy lever. It has exploited its 
monopoly over resources by limiting the supply of energy. This monopoly 
position is evident in relation to gas resources given that Russia supplies 
about 35% of Ukraine’s consumption and controls the transit of other 
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Ukrainian supplies (primarily from Turkmenistan) which amount to about 
40% (De Souza, 2008). Given the Russian ownership of gas pipelines and the 
complexities of Turkmen foreign policy, this is an extreme dependence on 
one source which is very difficult to diversify.  
In the area of oil, about 75% of consumption of Ukrainian refineries 
comes from Russia. Another important part is delivered from Central Asia 
(primarily Kazakhstan), again through Russian routes (De Souza, 2008, 
Emerson et al., 2006). Ukraine has tried to increase its bargaining power by 
using its geographical position as a transit country, raising transit fees and 
imposing other transit conditions on Russia. Yet, it remains unable to break 
its dependence on Russia.12 
Interdependence patterns can be found also in business networks of 
actors in the energy field. Ukraine’s energy related companies are often 
partly owned by Russian businesses and in need of restructuring. An 
example is Neftogaz, the Ukrainian gas company and the intermediary 
RosUkrEnergo. The latter has been sometimes described as a non-transparent 
network linked to those in power in both countries. There are several more 
non-transparent financial and industrial groups operating in the oil refining 
and coal mining sector, owned by Russian capital (Emerson et al. 2006).13  
Another example of structural interdependence is demonstrated by 
the electricity sector. Ukraine’s grid (except for a small segment), remains 
connected to the CIS grid, which has different technical characteristics from 
the European grid (Emerson et al. 2006).  
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On the whole, existing interdependence within the CIS and with Russia 
– structural (technical), geographical and economic – constrains considerably 
EU policy transfer in the field.  
 
Interdependence prompts institutionalization of new EU policies 
 
In early 2006 and again in January 2009, conflicts between Russia and 
the Ukraine over the price of gas led to disruptions of the supply to Ukraine 
and EU member states. Mediation efforts by the Czech EU Presidency in the 
January 2009 had little success despite an agreement signed between 
Gasprom and Ukraine. This most recent gas crisis has made it clear to the EU 
that an energy policy of its own is the only way to tackle its own and 
Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas.  
A truly common EU energy policy, engaging all the member states 
would make the EU position much stronger, but is resisted by Russia. 
Commenting on the proposed clauses in the Commission’s third energy 
liberalization package that would make bilateral energy deals an EU 
competence, a source in Russia's Economic and Trade Ministry stated that 
‘damage from such politicizing of investment issues will be reciprocal, but 
will hit the European Union more severely’ (Euractiv, 2008). 
 The Commission’s energy liberalization plan from September 2008 
contains a reciprocity clause (‘Gasprom clause’) that aims at inducing third 
countries to play by the EU’s rules. In November 2008, the Commission 
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proposed a new, wide-ranging energy package which aims to ensure energy 
security in Europe, including an EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action 
Plan (Commission, 2008c). The plan includes the objective of closer 
coordination between the member states in external energy relations, 
measures to make more efficient use of existing resources, build 
infrastructure to connect member states to each other’s electricity grids and 
energy efficiency measures. These developments support our view that 
interdependence and consequent openings for Russia to exercise its power 
are the causal factors that may lead to institutionalization of energy policy in 
the EU. Existing institutional arrangements cannot provide for a successful 
projection of EU policies. 
 
In conclusion: constraints to the EU’s external governance 
 
The comparison of the three policy areas above reveals a pattern of 
constraints to the EU’s external governance that increase when there is high 
interdependence with Russia/the CIS. We summarize our findings in Table 
2. 
 
Table 2: Patterns of EU External Governance and Interdependence with 
Russia/CIS per sector 
 EU-Ukraine External Governance 
(Rule/Policy Transfer) 
Ukraine-
Russia/CIS 
Ukraine-Russia/CIS 
Interdependence 
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 Substance Extent Legal/Institutional 
commitments 
 
Legacy-driven Geo-political/ 
economic 
T
ra
de
 
Title III PCA, 
Sectoral 
Agreements, AP 
areas, WTO 
acquis, 
‘Deep trade’ 
regulatory 
harmonization 
High level of 
rule transfer:   
- framework of 
general 
conditionality 
helped by 
economic 
incentives, 
procedural 
mechanisms;  
-WTO 
disciplines. 
Participation in 
CIS bodies and 
international 
agreements  
-Agreements 
substantively and 
institutionally 
weak; 
-no hard legal 
constraints 
(unless SES); 
- Conducive WTO 
process 
Some  
institutional 
legacies (e.g. 
standards)  
 
Diminishing 
economic 
interdependen
ce 
 
F
or
ei
gn
 p
ol
ic
y 
Alignment with 
Common 
Positions and 
Joint 
Operations, 
Specific 
Agreements 
High alignment 
but some 
important 
exceptions. 
Selective and 
cautious 
participation in 
international 
agreements.   
High 
inherited 
legacies in 
some fields 
(e.g. Black 
Sea Fleet) 
High geo-
political 
interdependen
ce 
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E
n
er
gy
 
Part of ‘deep 
trade’ 
regulatory 
framework,  
- Energy 
Community 
Treaty and 
others.  
- EU Energy 
Security and 
Solidarity 
Action Plan. 
Evolving yet 
problematic 
alignment. 
Helped by EU 
economic 
incentives, 
including 
technical 
assistance.   
Participation in 
CIS bodies and 
some 
international 
agreements. 
Highly politicized 
and non-
transparent 
regimes. 
High 
institutional 
and 
structural 
legacies (e.g. 
electric grid, 
cross-
ownership) 
High 
economic 
interdependen
ce 
 
As it can be seen, in trade constraints to EU rule transfer are low at 
present. The institutional engagement of the Ukraine in the CIS trade regime 
is soft and flexible. The progressive move towards deep trade arrangements 
between EU and Ukraine has entailed a growing departure from the 
inherited interdependences in some areas, such as standards. The WTO as 
an international framework of norms to which Russia also aspires facilitates 
rule adoption by the Ukraine.   
In foreign and security policy, interdependence remains important 
despite the formal alignment of Ukraine with most EU statements and 
positions. In this area we find a clash of the EU’s soft approach and Russia’s 
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politics of power that illuminates another important constraint to external 
governance. Russia’s strongly defined, 19th century concept of sovereignty 
not only clashes with EU norms in this area but leads to Russian actions  
which the EU is clearly powerless to counteract with external governance 
tools. 
In energy, Ukraine’s integration into EU’s energy market as a part of a 
deep trade arrangement requires the adoption of a set of regulatory 
standards. In this area, CIS institutional arrangements are soft, but in spite of 
their weakness, the existing infrastructural interdependence and Russia’s 
use of energy policy as a geopolitical tool (Lo, 2002), clearly limit the scope 
for EU rule transfer. 
Thus, we identify differences in the extent of interdependence with 
Russia: it is low and receding in trade; yet in energy it is high in view of 
Russia’s monopoly position and control over infrastructure. We also find 
differences in the interdependence patterns across policy areas. Russia has 
used mostly institutional levers in trade and mostly power policies in energy 
and foreign policy to constrain rule/policy adoption and implementation. 
Similarly, we see a differing depth of the effect on EU governance ranging 
from constraints of rule and policy selection (mostly in energy and FCSP) to  
primary effects on rule implementation (in trade).     
These findings are in line with the power model defined by Lavenex 
and Schimmelfennig (2009), which expects incentives and costs for domestic 
governments to be decisive in adoption of external rules. The current 
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restrictions to the EU’s effective governance posed by Russia’s power may 
be diminished if the EU were to offer the Ukraine a genuine prospect for 
membership, as enlargement might change the cost benefit calculation of 
domestic actors and increase the EU’s hierarchical power.  
The notion of governance presupposes forms of organization that go 
beyond hard notions of external and internal sovereignty (Lavenex 2004: 
682). For contemporary Russia, however, the idea of sovereignty is at the 
center of its view of itself, its neighbours and the state system in Europe. The 
Russian worldview may not include understanding of external governance 
as a projection of the EU’s own multi level governance system. In the apt 
words of Krastev (2008), the clash between EU and Russia is ultimately a 
clash between a post-modern state, embodied by the EU and the traditional 
modern state, embodied by Russia. In the Ukraine, more so than in any other 
part of the world, the successful spread of EU’s external governance may 
end where a strong notion of traditional power reasserts itself. 
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1
 For reasons of consistency, references to interdependence here follow Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
in this volume and do not aim to reflect the wider international relations literature on this topic. 
2
 This section draws on Dragneva and Dimitrova (2007). 
3
 More details in Dragneva and Dimitrova (2007).   
4
 The PCA also incorporates a Declaration concerning Article 102, which clarifies ‘special urgency’ 
as meaning cases of ‘material breach’ under the 1969 Vienna Convention. (C. Hillion, 2005). Such a 
suspension would be a very complex process on behalf of the EU. 
5
 ‘The stake in the internal market’ reward has developed further with the EC Commission 
Communication on Strengthening the ENP, COM(2006) 726 final, referring to an ‘economic 
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community’. This document contains stronger references to ‘the application of shared regulatory 
frameworks’ (Gstohl, 2008). 
6
 See also the decree by Yushchenko of 16 June 2005 on ‘Urgent Measures for Activation of 
Ukraine’s Participation in the Formation of SES’.  
7
 E.g. on textiles (Article 21 PCA, Sectoral agreement of March 2005), steel (Article 22 PCA, 
Sectoral agreement of December 2004), and nuclear materials (Article 23 PCA, Sectoral agreement 
of July 1999). 
8
 There are exemptions concerning some ‘sensitive’ goods, primarily agricultural commodities, 
traded subject to tariffs and quotas on a MFN basis, most specifically, with Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Uzbekistan. 
9
 The only duty imposed on the country which enters another preferential or integration agreement is 
to notify its partners of the terms of its participation. 
10
 A World Bank study suggests that such a step could lead to adverse effects for Ukraine if Russia 
uses its superior bargaining power in imposing its tariff structure as the SES common external tariff 
(World Bank, 2004). 
11
 See also Barbé et al. in this volume for an in-depth analysis. 
12
 An important aspect of this ‘energy addiction’ is the extreme domestic inefficiency of 
consumption, which the EU is also seeking to address (Emerson et al., 2006).  
13
 As Emerson et al. show, out of 5 refineries, 4 are held by Russian capital. Most of Russian foreign 
direct investment in Ukraine is concentrated in the fuel and energy sector (2006: 37).  
